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Using a model with upfront sunk costs, heterogeneous firms, and endogenous exchange rates, this
paper demonstrates theoretically that volatility in fundamental variables such as the nominal interest
rate that drive exchange rate volatility can simultaneously impact the entry behavior of multinational
firms through a relative price channel unrelated to exchange rate risk.  It then provides an empirical
illustration of the bias this endogeneity can cause when regressing measures of foreign direct investment
on exchange rate volatility.  It is the first paper to provide empirical evidence that interest rate volatility
may influence the behavior of multinational firms.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the single largest source of capital inﬂows for
developing countries. In industrialized countries, the size of FDI inﬂows ranges
from zero to almost half the size of gross ﬁxed capital formation. Surprisingly,
the impact of exchange rate variability on foreign direct investment rarely enters
debates over exchange rate management or monetary policy. One reason for this
omission could be the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the impact of exchange
rate variability on the investment behavior of multinational ﬁrms. A long list of
studies provide patches of evidence that multinational ﬁrms are likely to consider the
level and volatility of exchange rates before investing in overseas branches, but yield
conﬂicting theoretical predictions and empirical results. This study takes a fresh
look at the issue using a model with upfront sunk costs and endogenous exchange
rates. Though it does not resolve the puzzle, the model and subsequent empirical
examination provide one explanation for why exchange rate volatility has been seen
to both increase and decrease observed levels of foreign direct investment by showing
that underlying interest rate volatility is often positively correlated with exchange
rate volatility, but can have quite diﬀerent eﬀects on entry by foreign ﬁrms. The
ﬁndings also show for the ﬁrst time using data on entry by individual ﬁrms that
one-time sunk costs are a likely engine through which interest rate volatility impacts
the investment behavior of multinational ﬁrms.
The intuition underlying the model rests on four principal assumptions. First, an
unrecoverable upfront entry cost— here, the costs associated with conducting mergers
and acquisitions (M&As)— eﬀectively creates an option value in the tradition of Dixit
and Pindyck (1994). In a world with no upfront costs, a ﬁrm could simply take over
a new plant without regard to future conditions in any period when demand was
strong enough to yield positive proﬁts. In contrast, the sunk nature of the initial
investment in this model forces the ﬁrm to weigh the present discounted value of all
potential future proﬁts against the anticipated upfront cost of starting to produce in
a foreign country for the ﬁrst time. The one-time entry cost is in essence an exercise
price—a fee paid to exercise the option of taking over a plant abroad.
1Second, price stickiness causes an inverse relationship between the interest rate
and demand for goods produced by any ﬁrm, whether domestic or foreign-owned.
Any uncertainty in underlying macroeconomic variables may either encourage or
deter ﬁrms from entering the market, depending on the net impact it has on the
present discounted value of future proﬁts via the resulting covariance of the expected
exchange rate with demand and production costs. Further, uncertainty has the
eﬀect of increasing the expected discounted value of marginal costs for ﬁrms setting
prices in advance, causing them to set higher prices and pushing up the equilibrium
aggregate price level. In this model, a higher price level translates into higher entry
costs. Thus, sticky prices aﬀe c tb o t ht h eo p t i o nv a l u ea n dt h ee x e r c i s ep r i c eo f
investing abroad in the presence of uncertainty.
Third, for simplicity exchange rate behavior follows an uncovered interest rate
parity condition derived from the consumers’ choice between domestic and foreign
bonds. This means that exchange rate ﬂuctuations are driven by interest rate
shocks in the host and source countries. In particular, an increase in interest rate
volatility in either country increases exchange rate volatility. The impact of exchange
rate ﬂuctuations on the expected discounted value of variable proﬁts is neutralized
for foreign ﬁrms by the risk-sharing properties of trading home and foreign bonds.
However, by inﬂuencing the price level, the underlying interest rate volatility has
ad i r e c te ﬀect on the eﬀective cost of upfront investment expenditures. I argue
and show empirically that the impact of interest rate volatility on the magnitude of
the sunk costs involved in investment aﬀects ﬁrst-time foreign investors in the home
country diﬀerently than ﬁrms that already possess a functional facility in the home
country, whether they are home-owned or “veteran” foreign-owned ﬁrms that have
already invested there through mergers and acquisitions in prior periods.
Boosting foreign (source-country) interest rate volatility, for instance, pushes up
the foreign price level, which increases the one-time upfront coordination costs of
transferring technological and management know-how to a new country for the ﬁrst
time. That is, it increases the exercise price described above for ﬁrst-time foreign
investors. This is not the case for domestically owned home ﬁrms or for “veteran”
foreign ﬁrms undertaking repeated investments in the home country, who do not
2bear this upfront coordination cost because they either are operating in their native
land or already paid it when they entered the country for the ﬁrst time. Home
(host-country) interest rate volatility has a quite diﬀerent impact. By increasing
the price level, it pushes up the price of target ﬁrms on the home merger market.
This increases the opportunity cost of refusing to cash out for ﬁrms that already
possess a viable facility. It increases their willingness to sell faster than it dampens
the willingness of ﬁrst-time foreign investors to buy, which ends up increasing ﬁrst-
time FDI while decreasing domestic and veteran foreign entry. I quantify this wedge
between the two groups’ behavior as a function of their ﬁxed costs of entry (and the
opportunity cost of deciding not to cash out). Thus, depending on whether home
or foreign interest rate volatility is driving exchange rate risk, one can expect quite
diﬀerent impacts on entry by new and veteran foreign ﬁrms. The combination of
sticky prices and endogenous exchange rates motivates a well known endogeneity
problem ﬁrst uncovered in aggregate data on bilateral ﬂows of FDI between the US,
Canada, and the UK by Linda Goldberg and Charles Kolstad (1995).
Finally, the assumption that ﬁrms have heterogeneous productivity levels allows
the model to predict how many ﬁrms will invest abroad. Russ (2007) discusses the
diﬃculties that arise when addressing the question of how exchange rate risk aﬀects
FDI in a representative ﬁrm framework, where either all ﬁrms invest abroad or none
do. In this case, one can proxy changes in FDI by observing whether production by
the representative MNE increases or decreases in a particular period, but it is diﬃcult
to address questions about ﬁrms’ willingness to enter a market or, more broadly, why
t h e yw o u l di n v e s ta b r o a di na ne n v i r o n m e n tw i t hz e r op r o ﬁts. The heterogeneous
framework below allows one to predict that a larger or smaller number of ﬁrms will
invest abroad given a particular set of macroeconomic conditions. It also embraces
positive proﬁts as an incentive to invest at home or abroad and corresponds with
stylized facts regarding the size and value-added per worker of MNEs compared to
ﬁrms that operate only in their native country discussed in Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2003) and documented in Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005). Though this
model is considerably more stripped down insofar as it eliminates interesting features
such as persistence in exchange rate behavior, Ghironi and Melitz (2005) blazed a
3trail for introducing cross-border asset trade into a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms
with one-time sunk costs and endogenous exchange rates.
Previous empirical studies, listed in Table 1, have used a variety of data sources,
measures of FDI (i.e., as a percentage of GDP, as a proportion of domestic invest-
ment, or in absolute levels), deﬁnitions of volatility, regression methods, and country
breakdowns.2 Table 2 shows that whether investigators focus on real or nominal
exchange rate ﬂuctuations, the relationship between FDI and exchange rate volatility
varies depending on the sample period, country sample, and method of measuring
volatility. An important theoretical result in this study is that mergers and ac-
quisitions by veteran foreign investors3 respond quite diﬀerently to the interest rate
volatility that generates exchange rate volatility in the model. The empirical analy-
sis below supports the predictions of the model for ﬁrst-time and veteran cross-border
mergers and acquisitions between OECD countries. This may be one more reason
that past studies have found conﬂicting estimates of the relationship between aggre-
gate FDI ﬂows and exchange rate risk—the obseved relationship may vary depending
on the proportion of parent ﬁrms that are investing in a particular country for the
ﬁrst time.
2T h e M o d e l





























2Please see Russ (2007) for a detailed survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on
exchange rate volatility and FDI.
3Veteran foreign investors are ﬁrms who have already acquired one ﬁrm in a particular country
outside their native market and are making additional acquisitions there.
4Ct representing the aggregate consumption bundle in the home country, Lt the total
amount of labor supplied, and Mt
Pt the demand for real money balances.
T h ec o n s u m e rh a st h eo p t i o nt oi n v e s ta tt i m et in assets denominated in home
or foreign currency (Bt and B∗
t) which will pay a known, ﬁxed gross return of it and
i∗
t at the beginning of period t + 1. She also receives proﬁts from the portfolio of
home-owned ﬁrms operating at home or abroad in the form of a dividend, Πt,w h i c h
includes net revenues from ﬁrms’ merger market activities at home and abroad, so
that the budget constraint is of the form
Bt + StB
∗




t−1 + Mt−1 + Tt.
All seignorage revenue is transferred to consumers in the form of the lump-sum tax,
Tt. Preferences exhibit constant elasticity of substitution (CES) across goods so
that demand relations are downward sloping in the price of each good and expressed












where cj,t(i) is the consumption by home consumers of a good produced by a ﬁrm
owned by residents of country j (j ∈ (f,h)) operating in the home country. The

















Analogous equations apply for the representative foreign consumer, with an asterisk
used to denote variables involving levels of consumption, labor, assets, dividends,
money, and prices pertaining to activity in the foreign country.
52.1 Consumption and the exchange rate


















i∗). It is assumed that the money











where μ is a constant. Taking ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to Bt, B∗
t, Ct, Lt


























The UIP relation implies that a high home interest rate in period t will bring
about a lower value of St, meaning that— holding expectations of the future exchange
rate constant— there is an immediate appreciation in the home currency when the
interest rate on home bonds improves relative to foreign bonds. Thus, the covariance
between consumption and the exchange rate diﬀers depending on whether ﬂuctua-
tions in the host or source country interest rate are the main drivers of exchange rate













-All firms set 
prices for 
period t 
-it-1Bt-1   










-itBt   
- it+1 
revealed 
- Firms engage 
in merger 
market 




volatility, which here is equal to σ2
i + σ2
i∗ − 2cov(it,i ∗
t).
2.2 Firms and entry
Firms are permanently endowed with a labor productivity level, ϕ. The timeline in
Figure 1 displays the order of events in the economy. At the end of period t − 1,
all ﬁrms set prices and ﬁrms that operate only in their native market decide if they
will purchase a local marketing and distribution network in the market for mergers
a n da c q u i s i t i o n s . F i r m sw i t ha ne ﬃcient technology but no viable marketing and
distribution network in their own native market also must decide whether to purchase
a facility. At the beginning of period t, consumers receive (gross) interest payments
on government bonds purchased in the previous period and it is revealed. Then,
several things happen simultaneously: new ﬁrms pay entry costs, all production
takes place, consumers purchase bonds and goods, and the period-t exchange rate
materializes amidst the bond trading. The exchange rate is endogenous to bond
trading, but is not impacted by foreign direct investment activities.5
5See Lubik and Russ (2006) for a model where the exchange rate is endogenous to multinational
activity.
7The output of any ﬁrm operating in the home country owned by agents in country
j operating in the home market is given by
cj,t(ϕ)=ϕlj,t(ϕ).
They earn proﬁts in each period
πj,t(ϕ)=pj,t(ϕ)cj,t(ϕ) − Wtlj,t(ϕ).
Firms set prices in advance, so that period t prices are set given information available
at the end of period t − 1. They each choose a price for their goods by maximizing
proﬁts subject to the consumer demand relations above, which turns out to be a


























where the stochastic discount factor for home ﬁrm managers, derived from the con-















t−1 for foreign ﬁrm
managers.7 Using the consumption equation and the reduced-form expression for



















In the home market, Vt−1(0) represents the the endogenously determined price of
6See Appendix. Results are qualitatively the same even if a constant discount factor is used.
7From the ﬁrst-order conditions derived in the Appendix, it can be seen that these are equal to
the inverse of the nominal interest rate on Bt in each country.
8a network denominated in units of the home consumption bundle. The eﬃciency of
the parent ﬁrm is transferred to the target ﬁrm, so a target ﬁrm’s labor productivity
parameter has no impact at all on its takeover price. The takeover cost is paid at the
end of period t − 1. Firms observed in the data purchasing more than one network
in the merger market are treated in this model as though they are beginning to
market a brand new product line, with no economies of scope. Multinational ﬁrms
investing for the ﬁrst time in a particular country must also devote some resources
at their headquarters to transfer their technology to the new country and integrate
the overseas branch (in a way that conforms to both countries’ cultural and legal
systems) into their management structure. The cost is denominated in units of the
composite consumption good in the source country. For foreign ﬁrms investing for
the ﬁrst time in the home country, this cost is represented by P∗
t−1f.
Equilibrium is governed by an entry condition which stipulates that the expected
present discounted value of all future proﬁts accrued by the least productive ﬁrm
entering the overseas market equals the cost of entry. If it were more than the entry
cost, more ﬁrms would desire to invest. If it were less, ﬁrms would exit by liquidating
their overseas assets. I abstract from the purchase and sale of ﬁxed assets, assuming
here for simplicity that local ﬁrm assets are perfectly liquid within the local market
and eﬃciently priced, so that there are no expected capital gains on ﬁxed assets in
the steady state. The condition governing the behavior of foreign ﬁrms deciding
at time t − 1 whether to invest in the home market for the ﬁrst time (FT)a n d



























dt+m represents the compounding of the inverted gross
discount rate as the ﬁrm considers proﬁts that would be reaped further and further
into the future, making the present discounted value of total expected proﬁts ﬁnite.












− Pt−1Vt−1(0) ≡ 0. (4)
Further, for any home ﬁrm with ϕ<ˆ ϕh,t, the cash payment for its marketing and
distribution network on the merger market will exceed its expected discounted future














and will immediately sell their facilities on the merger market for the amount Pt−1Vt−1(0)
rather than engaging in production.
Substituting the pricing rules for each good into the formula for the aggregate








































Supposing that ﬁrms draw their labor productivity endowment from a cumulative
distribution with Pareto form, G(ϕ)=1 −ϕ−k,t h e nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms operating in
the home country owned by residents of country j will equal nj,t =1−G(ˆ ϕj,t)=ˆ ϕ
−k
j,t ,
where k is an exogenous shape parameter restricted to values greater than θ +1 .
Substituting expressions for wages, consumption, prices, the discount rate, the
10exchange rate (using the UIP equation), and expected interest rates and normalizing
St−1 ≡ 1, one obtains a pseudo-reduced form in the steady state for equation (3),8
V
FT





































One might surmise that “veteran” foreign ﬁrms making repeated takeovers in the
home country might also incur a headquarters coordination cost, but that it would
be much smaller than f, so that foreign interest rate volatility would have much less
or even zero deterrent eﬀect in comparison with ﬁrst-time foreign investors. Suppose,
for simplicity, that there is no additional headquarters coordination cost for veteran
foreign investors. Then, once we use the risk-sharing result from frictionless nominal
bond trading, dt = Std∗
t, their entry condition is identical to that of home ﬁrms
investing in their native market. Using equation (4), the analogous equation for
home ﬁrms is
Vh(ˆ ϕh)=V





























iV (0) ≡ 0
(6)
Using the implicit function rule, one can determine that ceteris paribus,as m a l l
increase in interest rate volatility arising in the source country will cause fewer ﬁrms
to invest, while a small increase in host country interest rate volatility will entice






















8See Appendix for derivation.
9See Appendix for proof.
11Moving ﬁxed costs to the right and dividing equations (5) and (6), one can also
















Numerical exercises below will show that the wedge between the total ﬁxed cost
of entry for ﬁrst time foreign investors versus domestic or veteran foreign investors,
1+
P∗f
PV(0), falls as σ2
i i n c r e a s e sa n dr i s e sa sσ2
i∗ increases. That is, increases in σ2
i drive
up the total ﬁxed cost of entry at a faster rate for domestic and veteran entrants
than for ﬁrst-time foreign entrants, for whom the headquarters coordination cost,
P∗f, is relatively unaﬀected by home interest rate volatility.10
Solving the full model numerically requires six equations: two entry conditions
for ﬁrst-time multinational entrants, two for native entrants, and a merger-market
clearing condition in each country. Merger-market clearing conditions in steady
state require that the number of active ﬁrms equal the number of existing marketing
and distribution networks. If a proportion η of all potential native entrepreneurs in
each country draw a viable network, then the steady-state merger market clearing
conditions are given by nh + nf = η i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ya n dn∗
h + n∗
f = η∗ in the
foreign country. One can also include two additional equations for veteran multina-
tional investors in each country, but (assuming that the headquarters coordination
cost is zero for repeated overseas takeovers) these turn out to be identical to the two
equations for native entrants, so they are left out of the numerical solution below
with the understanding that domestic and veteran foreign ﬁrms will have the same
response to changes in volatility. Thus, the numerical solutions mapped below cap-
ture a succession of steady states which vary only according to the level of home or
foreign interest rate volatility treating all foreign entrants into the home country as
though they are undertaking their ﬁrst overseas acquisition. The exact calibration
is written in the Appendix, but the basic result, that home volatility has little (zero
or a small positive) eﬀect whereas foreign interest rate volatility has an unequivo-
10P∗ is aﬀected indirectly, through changes in ˆ ϕ
∗
h.







































































FT Foreign entry as home volatility increases
FT Foreign entry as foreign volatility increases
Figure 2: Impact of Home i-rate volatility on First-Time Foreign entry into the Home
market
cally negative eﬀect on ﬁrst-time entry by foreign ﬁrms is robust to a wide range of
parameter values, as long as consumers are suﬃciently risk averse (ρ ≥ 1).
It is not possible to obtain an analytical solution for ˆ ϕf (and thus nf =ˆ ϕ
−γ
f )g i v e n
the calibration used here (ρ>1, θ>2), but the relationship between home interest
rate volatility, foreign interest rate volatility, and the number of ﬁrst-time foreign
entrants from numerical solution is shown in Figure 2. No linearization is necessary
to obtain the solutions. The model predicts that volatility in the host country
lowers the threshold productivity level for ﬁrst-time foreign investors, meaning that
for ρ>1, is easier for foreign ﬁrms to enter when σ2
i is higher. In contrast, volatility
originating in the source (foreign) country reduces entry by ﬁrst-time foreign entrants,
with little eﬀect on entry by native or veteran foreign investors except insofar as it
loosens up the merger market (lowering V (0)). Note from the reduced form of the


































































Figure 3: Impact of Home Interest Rate volatility on First-Time Foreign Entry
value function for the threshold ﬁrm that this impact grows with the size of the sunk
cost (f). Thus, the model predicts that while exchange rate volatility is positively
correlated with both home and foreign interest rate volatility, these two sources of
uncertainty have a very diﬀerent impact on foreign direct investment in the home
country. Home interest rate volatility has either a positive or zero impact on foreign
direct investment, while the relationship between foreign interest rate volatility and
entry is negative.
Figure 3 contrasts entry by ﬁrst-time foreign investors and domestically owned
home ﬁrms as home interest rate volatility increases.11 As home interest rate volatil-
ity increases, P also increases, the total cost of entry increases faster for home
(and similarly, veteran foreign) ﬁrms than for ﬁrst-time foreign entrants. Figure
11For the case of logarithmic preferences, where ρ = 1, both lines in this graph would be ﬂat and
home interest rate volatility would have no eﬀect on either variable.



















































































Figure 4: Relative Entry Rates and the Relative Price Eﬀect
4 illustrates the relative price eﬀect—the relationship between the ratio of entry rates
(
nh
nf) and the wedge between total ﬁxed costs of entry depicted in equation (7),
1+
P∗f
PV(0) as foreign interest rate volatility increases.12
3 Empirical Analysis
Given the model above, I estimate the reduced-form equations
lnnf,t = α + β1t + β2t





12An analogous graph with home volatility on the x-axis would show the lines growing closer







= α + β1t + β2t





where t is a time trend and Dt is a vector of ﬁxed eﬀects. I assume that although
volatility might change from year to year, prospective investors consider information
accumulated over several years prior to investing and expect volatility to remain
roughly the same as the level they observe in the period when they decide to invest.
Thus, each year t would represent a particular steady state from the perspective of
the investor. For both equations, the theory and numerical steady states above
imply that δ1 ≥ 0a n dδ2 < 0f o rﬁrst-time cross-border investment. The empirical
analysis takes place in four parts. First, regressions are run based on (8) for the
log number of ﬁrms investing in a country for the ﬁrst time. Second, to show the
importance of the sunk cost, the same regressions are run for all incidences of veteran
cross-border investment in the panel— investments by foreign ﬁrms that have already
invested in the host country— with quite diﬀerent results. Third, to neutralize
the impact of any time-varying, unobserved variables that may be impacting both
the volatility of interest rates and the general investment environment within each
country, which could cause an endogeneity problem similar to that described in Russ
(2007), all regressions are also run using the log ratio of foreign to domestic ﬁrst-
time acquirors, based on (9). Finally, to avoid the bias that taking logs and ignoring
zero-observations can generate in the standard linear regressions, described in detail
by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), a count-data regression is run based on equation
(8) using Poisson quasi-maximum-likelihood estimation. Results are robust to all
speciﬁcations.
Many factors can inﬂuence exchange rate volatility. Ideally, one would want to
be regressing the entry variables on the portion of exchange rate volatility gener-
ated by interest rate volatility. A structural vector autoregression (SVAR) is often
used for this type of variance decomposition. The panel speciﬁcation here is chosen
over an SVAR for several reasons. The most practical reason is that most SVAR
speciﬁcations assume a constant variance over the sample period. Using a multi-
variate GARCH framework can address this problem, but even for a two-country
16analysis, there is a large dimensionality obstacle. The panel also allows one to con-
sider information from a wider array of countries at once and the technique used
to measure volatility here meshes with the approaches used in most prior studies of
FDI. Nonetheless, nesting the entry behavior of multinational ﬁrms in a rigorous
time series model remains interesting ground for future research.
3.1 Data
Data on mergers and acquisitions is taken from Thomsons SDC Platinum database.
The dataset begins in 1980 and the sample used below starts with ﬁrms reporting
investment in a new country in 1986, based on dates the deals were executed (the
”eﬀective date”). Firms are assumed not to have conducted overseas mergers and
acquisitions prior to 1980. The number of ﬁrms native to one OECD country and
investing for the ﬁrst time in a diﬀerent OECD country are totalled by year, from
1986 through 2005. To clarify, a German ﬁrm conducting an M&A in the US in
1989 would be categorized as a ﬁrst-time entrant if it had no recorded acquisitions
in the US between 1980 and 1988, but a veteran entrant if it had already made an
acquisition in the US during that time. Interest rate variables are from the monthly
series corresponding to the US Fed Funds Rate in the IMF International Financial
Statistics. Where that was not available, the IFS series most closely corresponding
to an overnight rate was used. Volatility is measured in three diﬀerent ways, all of
which yield similar results: (1) the standard deviation of the demeaned change in the
monthly short-term interest rate, (2) the standard deviation of departures from the
mean short-term interest rate, and (3) the standard deviation of errors from a simple
AR-1 process (it = φit−1 + ut). All three methods are computed using 24-month
rolling windows, then taking an average of the changing monthly volatility measures
for each year. The ﬁrst method is a rigorous construction of σ2
i and σ2
i∗ as they
are rather simplistically modeled above, so results reported here are based on this
measurement approach, but the results are robust to each method. Fixed eﬀects are
included for host-source country pairs, ﬂows between EMU members, being about to
join the EMU, and the East Asian crisis years (1997, 1998, and 1999). I also include
17a linear and quadratic time trend to account for the fact that cross-border mergers
and acquistions are generally increasing across all countries during the sample period.
3.2 Results for ﬁrst-time investment
Table 3 displays results from regressions of the (log) number of cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions from each country to each country in each year on interest
rate volatilility in the source and host countries, which in this model represent the
reduced-form components of exchange rate volatility. A simple OLS regression re-
veals coeﬃcients on volatility of the expected sign, though only the negative eﬀect of
volatility originating in the source country is signiﬁcant. One might be concerned
that if monetary policy is coordinated in any degree across industrialized countries,
source and host interest rate volatility may be correlated. To address this prob-
lem, the regression is also run on the diﬀerence between source and host volatility
(σ2
i∗ −σ2
i), for which the coeﬃcient should negative, given the predictions for δ1 and
δ2.T h e c o e ﬃcient in this case is negative and still signiﬁcant. Using cluster-robust
errors in the OLS equation, as in columns (3) and (4), the coeﬃcients are all still
of the same sign but again only source-country interest rate volatility (column (3))
and the diﬀerence between source and host volatility (column (4)) have a signiﬁcant
impact. Clustering in this case is done by country pair, taking into account the
direction of ﬂows, so ﬂows from the US to Canada and from Canada to the US count
as two separate country pairs.
The levels of M&As between the country pairs are highly persistent: the Arrellano-
Bond test statistic reveals residuals with autocorrelation of degree one. I address
this problem using two diﬀerent methods. First, I use feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS), imposing a common level of autocorrelation in the errors across the
entire panel, but allowing for heteroskedasticity between country pairs, displayed in
column (5) of Table 3. The results are still of the same sign and both variables of
interest are now signiﬁcant at the 1% level, as is the volatility diﬀerential in column
(6). Second, I use an Arellano-Bond speciﬁcation. The GMM results in columns
(7) and (8) reveal that previous growth in entry is by far the best predictor of fu-
18ture growth in entry by foreigners. Again, the variables of interest, though small
in magnitude, are all of the predicted sign and with the exception of growth in host
volatility, are signiﬁcant at the 1% or 5% level. All results are robust to whether
the entire OECD sample is used or just a subset of outﬂows to all OECD countries
from G-7 countries. Thus, it is not likely that source-country interest rate volatility
simply indicates institutional instability that drives investment overseas.
3.3 Other determinants of FDI
Previous studies have linked numerous other variables to the propensity of foreigners
to invest in a particular country, including distance, host-country GDP and GDP
growth, and capital controls in the host country. The host-source country pair ﬁxed
eﬀects included in speciﬁcations (1)-(8) of Table 3 are interpreted as controlling for
distance. To control for changes in the host country’s macroeconomic environment
that are not captured in the simple model above, such as GDP growth, I run all of the
above speciﬁcations using the ratio of foreign to domestic mergers and acquisitions
as the dependent variable. Table 4 contains the results for this exercise, showing
that the sign of all coeﬃcients estimated on the variables of interest are again of
the predicted sign— negative for the level of interest rate volatility in the source
country and positive for the level of volatility in the host country for columns (1)-
(6), where the dependent variable is the log ratio of foreign to domestic M&As.
The coeﬃcients are also of predicted sign for the GMM estimations in columns (7)
and (8), where the dependent variable is the change in the log ratio of foreign to
domestic M&As. However, it is likely that autocorrelation is more of a concern in
all of these speciﬁcations, as the estimated autocorrelation coeﬃcients for the errors
across the panel in the FGLS regressions are twice as large as in Table 3 (0.18 vs
0.9). Host country volatility yields a signiﬁcant impact on the investment ratio only
for the GMM speciﬁcations, where it is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
negative impact of source volatility is signiﬁcant for the OLS estimates, as is the
source-host volatility diﬀerential in the FGLS speciﬁcation, but there is no evidence
o fas i g n i ﬁcant negative link under the GMM speciﬁcation, as columns (7) and (8)
19demonstrate that the coeﬃcient is of about the same magnitude whether source and
host volatilities are considered separately or combined into the source-host volatility
diﬀerential.
3.4 Repeat investors
All of these regressions are now conducted for veteran foreign investors—ﬁrms con-
ducting M&As in countries where they have already made at least one investment.
Table 5 shows no evidence that contemporaneous levels of source-country interest
rate volatility impact the decisions of veteran ﬁrms. In addition, column (7) in Ta-
ble 5 reveals a negative relationship between veteran FDI and host-country interest
rate volatility. In Table 6, noting the GMM speciﬁcations in columns (7) and (8),
there is again no clear evidence that veteran foreign investors respond any diﬀer-
ently to host- or source-country interest rate volatility than domestic investors. The
FGLS speciﬁcations show that veteran foreign investors might be more deterred by
any kind of interest rate volatility than domestic veteran investors, but the sign for
host country volatility and the volatility diﬀerential is diﬀerent than in any of the
clustered OLS or GMM speciﬁcations, calling into question its robustness. This re-
sult is important because it clariﬁes the nature of sunk costs—that one-time, upfront
sunk costs of the sort modeled above make ﬁrms more sensitive to volatility in the
fundamental variables, whether it arises from host- or source-country interest rates.
In contrast, repeated costs such as overhead, taxes, maintenance of distribution net-
works, and certain types of contracted labor that also may be sunk insofar as they
are paid or promised before the ﬁrm makes its sales and repatriates the proﬁts at a
future exchange rate, are not likely to have this eﬀect.
3.5 The Poisson speciﬁcation
Regressions above refer only to country pairs between which cross-border M&As
are actually taking place. Zero-observation pairs may also contain important in-
formation, insofar as omitting them can generate selection bias in the estimated
coeﬃcients. Further, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) demonstrate that bias can also arise
20when using logarithmic transformations of variables in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity. To address both of these issues, Table 7 presents estimates from a Poisson
quasi-maximum-likelihood speciﬁcation with robust standard errors using a count of
the number of M&As,
nf,t = α + β1t + β2t





Source-country interest rate volatility has a strongly signiﬁcant negative impact on
ﬁrst-time cross-border M&As, while host-country interest rate volatility has no sig-
niﬁcant impact. Joining the EMU increases the incidence rate for ﬁrst-time FDI
by about 21 percent and veteran FDI by 15 percent. In terms of size, joining the
Euro Area boosts ﬁrst-time FDI by about 10 times more than a one unit increase
in source-country volatility would dampen it. A one unit increase in volatility is an
increase of about 2.2 standard deviations for the US (which has a minimum volatil-
ity measure of 0.14 and a maximum of 1.8) and Switzerland, 3 standard deviations
for the Netherlands, 2 for the UK, 1.2 for Australia, 0.5 for South Korea, 0.26 for
Sweden, and 0.04 for Turkey. The standard deviation for the sample as a whole is
5.3. These patterns for hold for ﬁrst-timers even when EMU members are excluded,
when the US is excluded, and when only inﬂows to the US and UK are used. They
hold whether interest rate volatility is deﬁned as the variance of departures in the
monthy interest rate from the mean interest rate over two-year rolling windows (re-
ported here) or as the variance of demeaned changes in the interest rate over two-year
rolling windows. They do not hold for intra-EMU member ﬂows, where interest rate
volatility has no signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrst-time FDI. It is not clear whether this is
due to the common currency or due to the dramatically reduced sample size.
The situation is exactly the reverse for veteran cross-border investment. For
veteran cross-border investors, it is again host-country interest rate volatility that
acts as a deterrent, while source volatility has no signiﬁcant impact. This is true
when excluding EMU members, when excluding the US, and when using only ﬂows
into the UK and US. It also holds for both deﬁnitions of interest rate volatility
(variance of departures from the mean or of demeaned changes). Interest rate
21volatility has no signiﬁcant measurable impact on intra-EMU ﬂows. Again, a one
unit increase in host volatility has an impact about one-tenth the size of joining the
EMU.
The UIP condition used here to govern the behavior of expected exchange rates
is quite simplistic. One might conjecture that the measure of interest rate volatility
in the empirical analysis could be acting as a proxy for overall macroeconomic or
institutional uncertainty in the host and source countries. If this were the case, then
one would expect volatility to induce capital ﬂight— increased ﬂows of outward FDI.
However, it is seen in Tables 3, 4, and 7 that source country volatility consistently
either reduces or has no eﬀect on (outward) FDI, rather than increasing it. Hausman
and Fernandez-Arias (2001) provide convincing evidence that in emerging markets,
a high proportion of FDI relative to other types of investment may be the result of
investors trying to cope with institutional or other types of systemic instability in the
host country. This study complements those ﬁndings insofar as it ﬁnds a positive
link between host-country volatility and cross-border acquisitions. However, the
sample considered here consists of OECD countries and the results hold even for
inﬂows into the US and UK, where investors are not likely to have had such concerns
in recent years.
3.6 Actual exchange rate volatility
This model captures only a small part of the relationship between the exchange rate
and FDI, so it does not entirely resolve the puzzle by any means. To illustrate, I
take the case of ﬂows involving US ﬁrms as targets or acquirors. I draw montly
data on the bilateral exchange rate against the dollar from the St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank’s FRED database for each country except the US and use FRED’s
broad trade-weighted (US dollar) exchange rate for the US. To illustrate, column
(1) in Table 8 shows the coeﬃcients from an OLS regression on the equation
σ
2






22for the two deﬁnitions of volatility, in the spirit of Engel, Mark, and West (2007),
who ﬁnd that monetary variables are useful to predict exchange rate volatility, if not
always exchange rate levels. Within the sample here, bilateral exchange rate volatil-
ity against the US dollar is positively correlated with both host- and source-country
interest rate volatility, though only the coeﬃcient for host interest rate volatility
is signiﬁcant. In support of the modelabove, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between ﬁrst-time cross-border entry and the predicted volatility from
this equation (ˆ σ
2
s = α + β1t + β2t2 + λ1σ2
i,t + λ2σ2
i∗,t), regardless of how volatility is
deﬁned.
However, the deﬁnition of volatility does matter, both for the sign of the coeﬃ-
cient estimated for exchange rate volatility and for the impact of trying to clean out
the endogeneity problem discussed above. For volatility deﬁned as the variance of
departures from the mean (exchange rate or interest rate), we observe a negative and
weakly statistically signiﬁcant relationship between FDI and exchange rate volatility
in Column 3,13 which persists and gets somewhat larger when regressing nf,t on εt
instead of σ2
s, shown in Column 4. Column 5 and 6 show the same regressions run for
volatility deﬁned as demeaned changes in the exchange rate. Whereas exchange rate
volatility initially has no statistically signiﬁcant relationship with ﬁrst-time foreign
entry, the portion of exchange rate volatility not attributable to interest rate volatil-
ity (“cleaned” of the source of endogeneity discussed in this paper) has a positive
coeﬃcient that is weakly statistically signiﬁcant and three times larger than that for
σ2
s.F o r ﬁrst-time foreign investment, the deﬁnition of volatility is important—it is
not clear why one deﬁnition has a positive relationship with ﬁrst-time entry and the
other a negative one—but endogeneity, clearly at work in Columns 5 and 6, is also
important. For veteran investors (not shown here), neither the raw (σ2
s)n o rt h e
cleaned (εt) measures of exchange rate volatility have a signiﬁcant relationship with
the number of cross-border M&As. The fact that the two raw measures of exchange
rate volatility have statistically signiﬁcant correlations with ﬁrst-time FDI but not
with repeat foreign investment oﬀers another explanation for conﬂicting estimates
13Columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 8 all refer to Poisson quasi-MLE regressions with robust
standard errors, as in Table 7.
23across studies.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In summary, though interest rate volatility in this study’s panel is positively corre-
lated with the volatility of its exchange rate, host and source interest rate volatility
have quite diﬀerent eﬀects on ﬁrst-time and veteran foreign direct investment. In-
terest rate volatility in the host country encourages or has no eﬀect on ﬁrst-time
acquisitions by foreign ﬁrms, but soundly disourages veteran investors. In contrast,
interest rate volatility in the source country has little eﬀect on veteran cross-border
investors, but deters ﬁrms considering investing in a particular country for the ﬁrst
time. At the same time, both sources of volatility have (on average) a positive
correlation with exchange rate volatility in the sample studied here. Thus, the
empirical ﬁndings combined with the theoretical model above provide a clue to the
puzzle in existing literature trying to pindown the relationship between foreign direct
investment and exchange rate volatility.
The ﬁndings also demonstrate that the size of estimated coeﬃcients on exchange
rate volatility can be dampened by this endogeneity, but do not explain exactly why
the direction of the correlation between FDI and exchange rate volatility is positive
in some studies and negative in others. Further, common measures of exchange rate
volatility have signiﬁcant correlations with ﬁrst-time foreign investment, but not with
veteran investment for US bilateral ﬂows, which can not be accounted for in the model
here. Two possible reasons for these lingering pieces of the exchange rate-FDI puzzle
are (1) that ﬁnancial ﬂows involved in overseas investment and repatriated proﬁts
themselves inﬂuence the exchange rate, as suggested by the literature on valuation
eﬀects and modeled in Lubik and Russ (2006) and (2) that ﬁrms’ sensitivity to
risk in exchange rates and any fundamental variables that may drive them depends
on whether they are investing to sell goods locally or for export, as suggested by
Burstein, Kurtz, and Tesar (2007). Both directions provide plentiful ground for
future research.
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Chapter 8.
A Derivation of the aggregate price level
The pseudo-reduced form equation for the aggregate price level is calculated in three
steps: First, I deﬁne aggregate consumption as a function of the aggregate price index
and the exogenous interest rate, which lets me deﬁne the wage rate as a function of
the exogenous interest rate and underlying preference parameters. Second, I ﬁnd
30the ﬁrm’s pricing rule in terms of expected aggregate consumption and the wage
rate. These pricing rules now reduce to a function of the (exogenous) expected
interest rate and underlying parameters. Third, I substitute these ﬁrm pricing
rules into the deﬁnition of the aggregate price index to redeﬁne the index only in
terms of the expected interest rate, underlying parameters, and the endogenous cutoﬀ
productivity levels for home- and foreign-owned ﬁrms operating in the home economy.
A.1 Consumption and wages
Money demand and consumption. Based on the maximization problem described in
the text, standard ﬁrst-order conditions for the consumer’s problem (with λt repre-
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Dividing A1.c by λt, then substituting in A1.a and A1.b, A1.c yields the UIP
























31and substituting A1.b then gives an equation for the demand for real money balances

















In the text, I assume that the interest rate is exogenous and that the money supply is
an inverse function of the interest rate, MS
t =
μ
it−1, so that an increase in the interest
rate reduces the money supply and vice versa. To get the consumption equation






























Wages. To calculate the aggregate price level, I use the wage rate derived from
the consumer’s ﬁrst order condition A1.e, combined with the consumption equation,
labeled equation (A3) here. This generates a formula for the wage (equation (2) in








A.2 The ﬁrms’ pricing rules
After substituting in the consumption and wage equations above, pricing rules for




















A.3 The aggregate price level
Minimizing the expenditure necessary to consume one unit of the aggregate con-


















It is useful now to identify ﬁrms by their productivity parameter, ϕ, rather than the
ﬁrm subscript, i.E v e r y ﬁrm draws its productivity parameter independently from
an identical distribution, G(ϕ), allowing me to use the law of large numbers to assert
that the distribution of productivity levels for the economy as a whole will be the















































































































As long as there is a unique solution for ˆ ϕh,t and ˆ ϕf,t, there is a unique solution for
the price level. In a model where these two variables enter the zero-proﬁt conditions
with no other endogenous variables, one can show analytically that the zero-proﬁt
conditions are monotonically increasing in these cutoﬀ productivity levels. In this
model, an analytical proof is not possible due to the presence of the takeover price
V (0), so I show a graphical proof below that Vh(ϕ), or equation (6) from the main
text, is monotonically increasing in ϕ, implying the existence of a unique solution
for ˆ ϕh,t.S p e c i ﬁcally, I calibrate the model as described in Appendix D, setting
interest rate volatility in both countries to 0.1 (the particular value for volatility
does not aﬀect the monotonicity). Then, I specify values of ϕ such that 1 <ϕ<∞
and solve the system described in the text omitting the equation for Vh(ϕ) (that
is, Vh(ˆ ϕh,t)) so that all other endogenous values are solved for given the level of ϕ
speciﬁed. Finally, I numerically compute Vh(ϕ) given the solution values of all other
endogenous variables corresponding to various values of ϕ.
B First-order conditions for the ﬁrm’s problem
To set prices for the following period, ﬁrms maximize the expected value of proﬁts
with respect to the prices they will set subject to the demand equations in the text










































































Figure 5: The monotonicity of the value function (equation (6)) in ϕ
















































Assuming that ﬁrms take all competitors’ prices (and the aggregate price level) as
given, substituting the equations for goods demand, and the derivatives of the goods


























as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000). Reduced forms can be obtained by



















for j ∈ (h,j).
36C Deriving the impact of home and foreign volatil-
ity on MNE entry






















one can substitute in equation A1.b iterated over future periods and the UIP equation
for period t + k to obtain14













































































































14To illustrate the mechanics of the algebra in the proof, the second line below is presented as
though k>2, though of course the sequences start for k =0 .






































































































In this paper, the objective is to compare entry across steady states. In a steady
state, agents expect the one-period-ahead forecast of the nominal exchange rate and
functions of the nominal interest rate to be constant across all future periods. In
steady state, the number of active ﬁrms from abroad and the price level are also
constant. That is, for all k ≥ 0,

































ˆ ϕf,t =ˆ ϕf,t+k =ˆ ϕf =⇒ ¯ ϕt =¯ ϕt+k =¯ ϕ
Thus, the expected exchange rate on each side of (A7) cancels out. Substituting
the equations for the demand for an individual good, the pricing rule, and the wage








































































































































































































Parameters are assigned the following values: β =0 .96, θ = 7 (between the standard
values of 2 and 11 used in international macroeconomics literature), γ = θ + 1 (to
ensure the boundedness of the variance of output-weighted average productivity),
κ =1 ,f =0 .55 (so that approximately 25% of foreign ﬁrms invest if σ2
i = σ2
i∗ =0 ) ,
ρ =2 ,η =0 .5 (meaning half of all active domestically owned ﬁrms must purchase a
marketing and distribution facility), ¯ ı =¯ ı∗ =1 .045 (corresponding to a target rate
of 4.5%, similar to the Federal Reserve’s stated policies).
39Author Period Freq. of FDI Data Freq. of ER Data









Cushman (1985) 1963-78 annual5 quarterly







Zhang (2003) 1982-1999 annual9 unclear
1Nigeria
2Aggregate ﬂows into US
3Startups in US from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, UK
4F l o w sf r o mU St o2 0O E C Dc o u n t r i e s
5Flows from US to Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK
6Flows to US from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK
7FDI/GFCF to and from US and Canada, Japan, and UK
8OECD
9EU member countries (15)
Table 1: Previous Studies (Samples and Frequencies)
40Author Real/Nom. Deﬁnition of ER
Volatility
Eﬀect of Volatility on
FDI






real (1) st.dev. (1-yr) (+) for st.dev.
(2) GARCH (-) for GARCH
Campa (1993) real (1) st.dev. (2-yr) (-)




nominal st.dev. of percent
changes (1-yr)
(-)
Cushman (1985) real (1) st.dev. (4-qtr) (+)
(2) average level of de-
viations from
expected ppp (1-yr)




real st.dev. (12-qtr) (+)
Sekkat and Galgau
(2004)
nominal (1) st.dev. of monthly
level
(+) between EU coun-
tries
(2) st.dev. of monthly
pecent change
(-) between EU and
non-EU countries
(3) st.dev. of annual
percent
change (5-yr)
Zhang (2003) nominal st.dev. of percent
change
(+)
Table 2: Previous Studies (Deﬁnitions of Volatility and Results)
41Table 3:  Results for level of first-time cross-border M&As
Dependent Variable: Log of number of first-time cross-border M&As (n f)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FGLS FGLS GMM (Ar-Bn) GMM (Ar-Bn)
















    East Asian Crisis YYYYYYN / A N / A
    Host-source country pair YYYYYYN / A N / A
    Active EMU member YYYYYYN / A N / A
    1year before joining EMU YYYYYYN / A N / A
Linear and quadratic time trend YYYYYYY Y
Host-source pair heterosk. N N YYYYN N
Allow for autocorrelated error NNNNYYY Y
No. observations 4070 4070 4070 4070 5586 5586 3357 3357
Clusters or groups 448 448 522 522 366 366
R-squared .766 .766 .766 .766
Wald chi-squared(530) 53718
Wald chi-squared(529) 53930
AR(1) coefficient .092 .090
Wald chi-squared(5) 326.81
Wald chi-squared(4) 312.45
Quantities in parentheses are t-statistics, except in the case of the Arellano-Bond results in columns (7) and (8), in which case
they are z-statistics.  All variables pertain to period t unless otherwise indicated.  Clustering by country-pair where noted.
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2Table 4:  Results for level of first-time cross-border M&As relative to first-time domestic M&As
Dependent Variable: Log of ratio of cross-border M&As (n f/n h)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FGLS FGLS GMM (Ar-Bn) GMM (Ar-Bn)
















    East Asian Crisis YYYYY YN / A N / A
    Host-source country pair YYYYY YN / A N / A
    Active EMU member YYYYY YN / A N / A
    1 year before joining EMU YYYYY YN / A N / A
Linear and quadratic time trend YYYYY YY Y
Host-source pair heterosk. N N Y Y Y Y N N
Allow for autocorrelated error NNNNY YY Y
No. observations 4049 4050 4051 4052 3991 3991 3308 3308
Clusters or groups 448 448 389 389 366 366
R-squared .844 .844 .844 .844
Wald chi-squared(397) 191353
Wald chi-squared(395) 173969
AR(1) coefficient .184 .184
Wald chi-squared(5) 258
Wald chi-squared(4) 258
Quantities in parentheses are t-statistics, except in the case of the Arellano-Bond results in columns (7) and (8), in which case
they are z-statistics.  All variables pertain to period t unless otherwise indicated.  Clustering by country-pair where noted.
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2Table 5:  Results for level of veteran cross-border M&As
Dependent Variable: Log of number of veteran cross-border M&As (n f)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FGLS FGLS GMM (Ar-Bn) GMM (Ar-Bn)
















    East Asian Crisis YYYYYYN / A N / A
    Host-source country pair YYYYYYN / A N / A
    Active EMU member YYYYYYN / A N / A
    1year before joining EMU YYYYYYN / A N / A
Linear and quadratic time trend YYYYYYY Y
Host-source pair heterosk. N N YYYYN N
Allow for autocorrelated error NNNNYYY Y
No. observations 2555 2555 2555 2555 3442 3442 2084 2084
Clusters or groups 312 312 366 366 254 254
R-squared .818 .818 .818 .818
Wald chi-squared(374) 126260
Wald chi-squared(373) 79313
AR(1) coefficient .090 0.07
Wald chi-squared(5) 408.97
Wald chi-squared(4) 406.68
Quantities in parentheses are t-statistics, except in the case of the Arellano-Bond results in columns (7) and (8), in which case
they are z-statistics.  All variables pertain to period t unless otherwise indicated.  Clustering by country-pair where noted.






i∗ 2 − i
2











i∗ 2 − i
2





2Table 6:  Results for level of veteran cross-border M&As relative to veteran domestic M&As
Dependent Variable: Log of ratio of veteran cross-border M&As (n f/n h)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FGLS FGLS GMM (Ar-Bn) GMM (Ar-Bn)
















    East Asian Crisis Y Y Y Y Y Y N/A N/A
    Host-source country pair Y Y Y Y Y Y N/A N/A
    Active EMU member Y Y Y Y Y Y N/A N/A
    1year before joining EMU Y Y Y Y Y Y N/A N/A
Linear and quadratic time trend Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Host-source pair heterosk. N N Y Y Y Y N N
Allow for autocorrelated error NNNNY YY Y
No. observations 2544 2544 2544 2544 3395 2498 2073 2073
Clusters or groups 307 307 358 261 253 253
R-squared .891 .890 .891 .89
Wald chi-squared(366) 82619
Wald chi-squared(365) 65776
AR(1) coefficient .126 .130
Wald chi-squared(5) 62.54
Wald chi-squared(4) 62.78
Quantities in parentheses are t-statistics, except in the case of the Arellano-Bond results in columns (7) and (8), in which case
they are z-statistics.  All variables pertain to period t unless otherwise indicated.  Clustering by country-pair where noted.
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2Table 7:  Poisson Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood Specifications















    East Asian Crisis Y Y
    Host-source country pair Y Y
    Active EMU member Y Y
    1 year before joining EMU Y Y
Linear and quadratic time trend Y Y
Host-source pair heterosk. Y Y
Allow for autocorrelated error N N
No. observations 5586 3442
Clusters or groups 522 366
Wald chi-squared(9) 2320.62 1846.75
Quantities in parentheses are z-statistics.






2Table 8:  Endogeneity and Exchange Rates
          DepVar:  DepVar: n f

















    East Asian Crisis Y Y Y Y Y Y
    Host-source country pair Y Y Y Y Y Y
    Active EMU member Y Y Y Y Y Y
    1 year before joining EMU Y Y Y Y Y Y
Linear and quadratic time trend Y Y Y Y Y Y
Host-source pair heterosk. N N Y Y Y Y
Allow for autocorrelated error N N N N N N
No. observations 857 857 885 885 884 855
Clusters or groups 54 54 55 52 55 52
R-squared (overall) 0.30 0.31
Wald chi-squared(7) 1449.47 1433.60 1440.66 1438.31
Quantities in parentheses are t-statstics in Columns1-2, z-statistics in Columns 3-6.
***: Significance at 1% level, **: Significance at 5% level, *: Significance at 10% level
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